Nous, êtres humains, sommes issus d'une longue évolution, minérale et cosmique d'abord, biologique et terrestre ensuite. Pour certains, nous aurions définitivement rompu avec un héritage ancestral qui faisait de nous des bêtes. Nous seuls serions capables du sens du bien et du sens du beau. Nous seuls serions doués de morale. Il existerait ainsi un fossé infranchissable entre le grand philosophe Emmanuel Kant et nos cousins les chimpanzés! Ou bien, au contraire, faut-il considérer que la morale et l'esthétique chez l'homme (...) plongent leurs racines dans le terreau de la «nature»? Les animaux ne sont-ils pas eux aussi capables de dévouement pour leurs proches? Nos cousins les primates ne peuvent-ils pas éprouver eux aussi des sentiments en face d'une belle chimpanzé? Bref, la découverte des «cultures animales» n'amène-t-elle pas à concevoir davantage de continuité entre l'homme et l'animal? (shrink)

The full text of the Bishop Westcott Memorial Lecture of 1968 on the subject of Bishop Westcott and the Platonic tradition.

Entre Hegel, "le philosophe du christianisme", et Girard, "l'anthropologue du christianisme", il y a un fossé de deux siècles marqués par une montée considérable de la violence dont Auschwitz et Hiroshima restent les premiers sommets. Cette "montée aux extrêmes" que Hegel n'avait pas prévue, son contemporain Clausewitz l'a parfaitement perçue. Si Hegel et Clausewitz sont "les deux grands penseurs de la guerre", seul Clausewitz permet de penser l'actuel et terrible phénomène du terrorisme. De même, si Hegel décrit le devenir historique (...) comme une triomphante "Odyssée de l'esprit", Girard, à la lumière de Clausewitz, mais aussi d'Hölderlin, en révèle le sens apocalyptique. Le passage de Hegel à Girard est donc celui "de la guerre au terrorisme" et de "l'Odyssée de l'esprit à l'Apocalypse". (shrink)

Examines the philosophical and clinical history of scientific medicine, and critiques the movements in psychoneuroimmunology and holistic and environmental medicine.

In his book, The Scientific Image, van Fraassen lucidly draws an alternative to scientific realism, which he calls "Constructive Empiricism". In this epistemological theory, the concept of observability plays the pivotal role: acceptable theories may be believed only where what they say solely concerns observables. Van Fraassen develops a concept of observability which is, as he admits, vague, relative, science-dependent, and anthropocentric. I draw out unacceptable consequences of each of these aspects of his concept. Also, I argue against his assumption (...) that "empirical adequacy" is the same thing as "saving the phenomena", according to his sense of the expressions. (shrink)

Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by (...) offering a vector functional, hence physicalist, theory of the percept--the perceptual experience itself, a paradigm of phenomenally immediate, introspectively accessible consciousness. (shrink)

In the fusillade he lets fly against Foss (1984), Bourgeois (1987) sometimes hits a live target. I admit that I went beyond the letter of van Fraassen's The Scientific Image (1980), making inferences and drawing conclusions which are often absurd. I maintain, however, that the absurdities must be charged to van Fraassen's account. While I cannot redress every errant shot of Bourgeois, his essay reveals the need for further discussion of the concepts of the phenomena and the observables as (...) used by van Fraassen. (shrink)

The strong intuition that the facts concerning the subjectivity of consciousness are simply beyond the grasp of objective science is the highest barrier to an intuitively convincing materialism in the philosophy of mind. We are steeped in a tradition which has it that there is, to state it from the first-person point of view, an epistemic difference in principle between my introspectible experience, which only I can apprehend and know, and the things which everyone can apprehend and which form the (...) domain of the natural sciences. This contrast is sometimes cast as that between the subjective stuff of first-person introspectible consciousness and the objective stuff of the natural sciences. In this essay, I will try to budge the view of the subjective-objective distinction which underlies this tradition from its position as tacit dogma. (shrink)

Given that the mind is the brain, as materialists insist, those who would understand the mind must understand the brain. Assuming that arrays of neural firing frequencies are highly salient aspects of brain information processing (the vector functional account), four hurdles to an understanding of the brain are identified and inspected: indeterminacy, micro-specificity, chaos, and openness.

The questions examined in the book speak directly to neuroscientists, computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers.

There is no problem more paradigmatically philosophical than the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, I will argue that the problem is empirical. I am not even suggesting that conceptual analysis of the various mind-body theories be abandoned – just as I could not suggest it be abandoned for theories in physics or biology. But unlike the question, ‘Is every even number greater than 2 equal to the sum of two primes?’ the mind-body problem cannot be solved a priori, by analysis alone; though (...) I will not argue this thesis here, it is nearly obvious, since purported solutions must make matter of fact claims, heavy with existential import, about the real world. By contrast, an investigation of the sensitivity of the mind-body problem to empirical evidence will show that purported solutions to the problem are empirically testable, to a degree consistent with philosophy giving a clarified mind-body problem to the sciences. I offer the bold outlines of such an investigation here. (shrink)

This new anthology includes both classic and contemporary readings on the methods and scope of science. Jeffrey Foss depicts science in a broadly humanistic context, contending that it is philosophically interesting because it has reshaped nearly all aspects of human culture—and in so doing has reshaped humanity as well. While providing a strong introduction to epistemological and metaphysical issues in science, this text goes beyond the traditional topics, enlarging the scope of philosophical engagement with science. Substantial introductions and critical (...) questions are provided for each reading. (shrink)

The basic premise of today's scientific medicine is that the ‘book of man’ is written in the language of the biological sciences, ultimately molecular genetics and biochemistry. The patient is a complex biological organism and disease is a deviation from the norm of somatic parameters. At the same time, many major contemporary diseases are reported to have psychosocial and environmental components in their etiology. Hence the challenge: how can a medical model be both scientific and conceptually well-suited to today's disease (...) burden? I argue that certain contemporary "postmodern" sciences support alternative, non-reductionist (self-organizational) premises. So doing, they offer an infrastructure for a medical model at once scientific and responsive to the diseases at hand. Keywords: biomedicine (biological medicine), natural science paradigm, Cartesian dualism, self-organization, postmodern sciences, self-referentiality CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories of meaning of (...) Dretske, Fodor, Burge, Putnam, and Kripke on the grounds that each requires that our mental states, unlike those of artifacts, have meaning intrinsically. I argue that we are Unmeant Meaners, incidentally defending Dretske et al., though my goal is to test the explanatory virtue of the intentional stance as applied to the evolution of intentionality. (shrink)

Mele desires to believe that the self-deceived have consistent beliefs. Beliefs are not observable, but are instead ascribed within an explanatory framework. Because explanatory cogency is the only criterion for belief attribution, Mele should carefully attend to the logic of belief-desire explanation. He does not, and the consistency of his own account as well as that of the self-deceived, are the victims.

Peirce measures the testability of scientific hypotheses by these oft-repeated standards: "money, time, energy, thought". His concept of testability is outlined and developed. It is found to be strikingly different, but not incompatible with, the positivist-empiricist concept of testability- in-principle. Peirce's concept of testability is, however, much richer than the received positivist-empiricist concept, and plays a larger, more central role in the logic of science, as Peirce sees it. In particular, Peirce's concept, in its role in his theory of the (...) economy of research, shows how the acceptance of scientific hypotheses is itself a function of economic factors, and thus is not value-neutral. (shrink)

In the not-too-distant future the scientific realism debate will be absorbed into the far more ancient-and-venerable, old-and-unqualified, realism debate. The first efficient mover of this absorption will be the fact that scientific ontology is a growing and very mixed bag, including not just rocks, plants, animals, and stars, but the Higgs boson, the Big Bang, evolutionary pressures, teenage anxieties, economic growth, social trends, countries, industrial toxins, and hedge funds. Trying to hedge off these ever-stranger newcomers by such moves as castling (...) the debate within well- established, mature, basic physics is to submit to a biased umpire, with a narrow strike-zone, to get to an arbitrary first base. (shrink)

Beyond Environmentalism is the first book of its kind to present a timely and relevant analysis of environmentalism.

Thesis: Art like science radically affects our perceiving and thinking, and the two are substantially alike in that together--along with an inherited "natural" language system with which they overlap--they enable us to articulate the world. Science has been advanced as the measure of all things: scientific realism. By implication, art pertains to beauty, science truth. Science effects conceptual break-throughs, changes our models of natural order. On the contrary (I argue), as a nonverbal symbol system art similarly affects paradigm-induced expectations. Substantively (...) there is no difference in the way each enables us to articulate or measure the world: symbolic realism. The myth of resemblance as a criterion of representation--imitation as a one-one relation--has, at least since the time of Plato, obscured this truth. Once the distinction between representational and nonrepresentational art falls, the true nature of artist (like scientist) as maker is illumined. The artist, the scientist (disciplinarian), the cosmologist (those responsible for the formulation of so-called natural languages--in time all of us) make the world or, what practically amounts to the same thing, the known, perceived world. This is the claim of the symbolic realist. Is symbolic realism itself only a watershed? What implication does this critique have for assessing the role of the philosopher today? (shrink)

Feigl is concerned with the problem of how one sublanguage supplants another, e.g., how the language of quantum mechanics may be said to supplant that of classical physics. As a preliminary to tackling the problem, it has first to be generalized. Thus, in order to indicate how one language might supplant another, the line of a general theory of truth has to be traced. Among the conditions that such a theory has to satisfy is that its truth criteria must permit (...) us to evaluate current consensus judgments in science as true, on a par with the truth of our everyday ‘factual’ or ‘noninferential’ judgments. (shrink)

Geary's project faces the severe methodological difficulty of tracing the biological effects of gender on mathematical ability in a system that is massively open. Two methodological stratagems he uses are considered. The first is that pancultural sex differences are biological in nature, which is dubious in the domain of mathematics, since it is completely culture-bound. The second is that sociosexual differences are partly caused by biosexual differences, which renders his thesis unfalsifiable and empirically empty.

As the transaction cost theory of the firm was taking shape in the 1970s, another important movement in economics was emerging: a revival of the ‘Austrian’ tradition in economic theory associated with such economists as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek . As Oliver Williamson has pointed out, Austrian economics is among the diverse sources for transaction cost economics. In particular, Williamson frequently cites Hayek , particularly Hayek’s emphasis on adaptation as a key problem of economic organisation . Following (...) Williamson’s lead, a reference to Hayek’s ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ has become almost mandatory in discussions of economic organisation . However, there are many other potential links between Austrian and transaction cost economics that have not been explored closely and exploited.This article argues that characteristically Austrian ideas about property, entrepreneurship, economic calculation, tacit knowledge, and the temporal structure of capital have important implications for theories of economic organisation, transaction cost economics in particular. Austrian economists have not, however, devoted substantial attention to the theory of the firm, preferring to focus on business-cycle theory, welfare economics, political economy, comparative economic systems, and other areas. Until recently the theory of the firm was an almost completely neglected area in Austrian economics, but over the last decade, a small Austrian literature on the firm has emerged. While these works cover a wide variety of theoretical and applied topics, their authors share the view that Austrian insights have something to offer students of firm organisation. (shrink)

I‘m a materialist, and not too embarassed about it. It would be nice to have a knock down argument to defend materialism, but not having one, I instinctively fight off idealists, dualists, skeptics, or whatever, with the same punches and feints used by materialists from time immemorial. Like, say, the snide observation that a material like liquor gets even my idealist friends drunk, or that the senile dualists I have known don't seem at all to consist of ageless minds trapped (...) in aging bodies. I will not resort to ad baculum, because all non-materialists I‘ve known, of whatever stripe, act as though tampering with their bodies is the same as tampering with their very selves. (shrink)

The 'Austrian' tradition is well-known for its definitive contributions to economics in the twentieth century. However, Austrian economics also offers an exciting research agenda outside the traditional boundaries of economics, especially in the management disciplines. This Element examines how Austrian ideas play a key role in expanding the understanding of fields like entrepreneurship, strategy, and organization. It focuses especially on the vital role that entrepreneurs play in guiding economic progress by shaping firms and their strategic behavior. In doing so, it (...) explains a wide range of contributions that Austrian economics makes to the understanding of key problems in management, while also highlighting many directions for future work in this inspiring tradition. (shrink)

The object of this essay is to demonstrate a logical connection between beliefs and values. It is argued that such a connection can be established only if one keeps in mind the question: What is minimally required in order that it makes sense to speak of beliefs and values at all? Thus, the concept of minimal rationality is indispensable to the task at hand. A particular example of a logical connection between a belief and a value is examined, which leads (...) to a formal rule (Rule of Minimal Rationality) which expresses in general the logical connection between beliefs and values. This rule is elaborated to include attempted activities as well as activities simpliciter, activities having been discovered as essential to any logical connection between beliefs and values. Finally, some interesting implications and promising applications of the Rule of Minimal Rationality are outlined. (shrink)

Heyman's two crucial theses are that people over-value immediate rewards, and that addictive substances “subvert the value of competing commodities.” These perennial ideas were discussed by Plato. Whereas Heyman provides scientific clarification and support for the first, the second remains problematic. I outline how this deficiency might be remedied via evolutionary considerations.

Economics in general, and the theory of the firm more specifically, places motivation and cognition in very different analytical boxes, in spite of cognitive science evidence that the boundaries between the two are in reality blurred. While this analytical assumption has often served the theory of the firm well, a number of organizational phenomena are better understood if cognition and motivation are allowed to interact, for example, through framing effects, as organizational scholars have long argued. The paper exemplifies by developing (...) the implications of this for Williamson’s notion of the “impossibility of selective intervention.”théorie de la firme en particulier placent la motivation et la connaissance dans des boites analytiques très différentes, en dépit de preuves scientifiques affirmant que les deux se confondent dans la réalité. Même si cette hypothèse analytique a souvent été utile dans la théorie de la firme, certains phénomènes organisationnels sont mieux compris si on permet à la connaissance et à la motivation de réagir réciproquement, par exemple à travers des effets d’“encadrement ” comme les théoriciens des organisations le soutiennent depuis longtemps. Ce papier illustre cette interaction en développant les implications de l’effet d’encadrement pour la notion d’“impossibilité d’intervention sélective” de Williamson. (shrink)

Dayton's account of lewis' pragmatic contradiction seriously misconstrues this key concept by analyzing it in terms of logical contradiction. this order of analysis is explicitly rejected by lewis as the reverse of the proper order in which the pragmatic concept is foundational to logic and epistemology. i outline a correct account of pragmatic contradiction. then lewis' application of the idea to moral skepticism and the liar paradox is reconsidered, and is seen to vindicate his claim that both skeptic and liar (...) are defeated by a non-fallacious "ad hominem" consisting of a demonstration that each is in pragmatic contradiction. (shrink)

I address the issue of justifiable profits from distinct perspectives in economics, strategy research and ethics. Combining insights from Austrian economics, the resource-based perspective, and finders, keepers ethics, I argue that strategy is about the discovery of hitherto unexploited possibilities for exchange. To the extent that strategy is about the discovery/creation ex nihilo of products, ways of producing products, etc., the resulting profits are argued to be justifiable from a finders, keepers perspective.